Re-Imagining Forced Migration Governance for 2030

by the GGF 2030 Global Migration and Refugee Challenge Working Group


The Global Governance Futures program (GGF) brings together young professionals to look ahead 10 years and think of ways to better address global challenges. Building on a decade of successful rounds of the GGF program, GGF 2030 convened 27 fellows from Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, and the United States (three from each country). Over the course of 2018 and 2019, the fellows participated in four dialogue sessions, which took place in Washington, DC, New Delhi, São Paulo, and Paris and Berlin.

The GGF 2030 fellows – selected from the public, private and non-profit sectors – formed three working groups, each focusing on one key global issue. For this round, they focused on the futures of global order, the global migration and refugee challenge, and the role of cities in global governance. Using strategic foresight instruments, including scenario planning and risk assessment, the working groups produced scenarios for their respective issue areas. Based on their findings, the fellows put together a range of products that outline scenarios of potential global governance challenges of the coming decade and ways to address them.

In addition to learning about and implementing the scenario planning methodology, our fellows met with leading policymakers and experts from each participating country, whose insights helped shape the scenarios.

The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the organizations they work for.


The Futures of the Global Migration and Refugee Challenge

For the purpose of our scenario planning efforts, we as a group defined our topic as 'Re-imagining forced migration governance for 2030,' within the broader theme of the 'Global Migration and Refugee Challenge.'

We focused on forced migration including mixed migration flows. The term 'forced migration' captures the various categories of mobility we thought are important, including refugees and other forms of forced migration (such as IDPs, climate-induced displacement, and victims of trafficking).

Discussions within the group and with experts helped us identify key trends that are crucial to consider for the future of forced migration governance, such as: (1) environmental displacement; (2) statelessness; (3) internally displaced persons; (4) the role of the private sector (positive as well as negative); and (5) the (positive or negative) role of technology. Critically, one of the experts pointed out that an important scenario to consider would be what a functioning responsibility-sharing framework would look like.

The aforementioned trends helped the group arrive at three guiding questions:

Focal Questions

Who will be the forced migrants up to and in 2030, and why will they be forced to move?
Who will be the stakeholders and what will their roles and responsibilities be in co-shaping forced migration governance? The second question places emphasis on potential responses and key actors.
What would effective and equitable forced migration governance look like in 2030? The third question provided the opportunity to challenge the status quo of the current forced migration governance structures and processes.


Ultimately, the group sought to develop innovative mechanisms to address the third question.

It is important to include the terms “effective” and “equitable” for the following reasons: effective because the proposal should be pragmatic and implementable, and equitable because the current system is neither sustainable nor justifiable.

What Are the Key Uncertainties?

Among the clearest is the uncertainty surrounding a one-state solution for the Palestinian situation. The group further considered the continued fragility of regional bodies. For example, the group noted that it was uncertain that the European Union (EU) would still exist in 2030. Another uncertainty is whether or not the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) would merge by 2030.

The group highlighted the following assumptions deemed to have high variance: (1) Actors in proxy conflicts will take more responsibility for forced migrants. (2) Youth voices and involvement will impact policymaking for forced migration. (3) The international community will have an enforceable shared-responsibility arrangement. In addition, while a team representing refugees competed in the last Olympics, the group believed that this was unlikely to translate into a representative body of forced migrants within the United Nations (UN).

What Can We Be Certain Of?

New technologies will play an important role in finding innovative solutions for forced migrants. However, we also noted that technologies have the potential for harming this target group, for instance in terms of privacy and data protection.

Further, the group thought it certain that if the private sector was involved in forced migration service provision, it will likely play a negative role. Critically, the group unanimously agreed that cities will be key actors in the future and, as a consequence, the Westphalian system will have a decreased role. Finally, environmental issues will be a key factor in forced migration governance.

Regarding assumptions with high variance, the group arrived at some certainties deemed to be especially crucial: (1) Existing multilateral organization working on forced migration will weaken. (2) Sectarian conflict and Islamophobia will increase. (3) An international process will emerge to address forced migration challenges, thus 'reinventing the wheel.'

The group arrived at these certainties and uncertainties based on the following types of logic:

  1. A causal relationship (e.g., “environmental displacement will increase statelessness”);
  2. Mitigation effect of technology (e.g., “salination and desertification reduce livable land and increase number of forced migrants”);
  3. Use of specific terms/concepts that have embedded meanings make our assumption too narrow (e.g., “proxy wars will lead to more displacement of people” was changed to “proxy conflicts…” or “another version of the Global Compact will emerge claiming to address forced migration challenges” was changed to “another international process…”);
  4. Degree of regional specificity (e.g., “forced migration will increase in Central Asia due to radicalization”);
  5. Use of deterministic words like “lead” or “enforceable” (e.g., “Latin America will lead an innovative response to the forced migrant crisis,” or “in 2030 the international community will have an enforceable responsibility sharing arrangement”);
  6. Topics where some in the group have more information/knowledge than others (e.g., on the topic of environmental displacement; “a new UN body for environmental displacees will emerge”);
  7. Topics where some in the group are more optimistic than others (e.g., “a representative body of all forced migrants will emerge within the UN” was changed from “more migrants will have a seat at the table in forced migration governance”);
  8. Issues where phrasing needed more specificity (e.g., “more migrants will have a seat at the table in forced migration governance”);

The group often disagreed on the future implications of certain themes, such as climate change (environmental displacement specifically), how conflict will evolve, and the role of technology in mitigating climate change, among others.

Scenario 1: "Broken Telephone"

With increased digital access, the impact of misinformation on forced migration is exacerbated.

This scenario explores how one local event can become a devastating global crisis, as misinformation amplifies problematic messages among digitally advanced communities who do not have the capabilities to combat divisive content. This scenario is set in modern day South Asia, often called “the most dangerous place in the world.”

The scenario begins with rumors of an incident. These rumors snowball into a regional crisis with forced migrants at its core. The scenario explores how vulnerable groups (e.g., refugees, religious minorities, forced migrants) are impacted by misinformation, and how there is little incentive to solve a problem like this, as there are political and economic gains to be made from the problem’s exploitation.

The region has seen a more and more chauvinist nationalist governments come to power, which foster divisive politics. The region is home to three nuclear powers (India, Pakistan and China) and has a long history of volatility. Any incident in this region is considered a global issue. It has also seen a rise in the use of internet-enabled phones and increased access to information. Further, the region is vulnerable to hate-mongering and has already seen the impact of misinformation on communal relations, which has caused riots and displaced thousands. With low literacy and high digital penetration as well as a lack of government capabilities and political will, this region is primed for the scenario.

Overall Context

  • Increased digital access and low media literacy across the world
  • Preconceived negative ideas about refugees
  • Growing Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments
  • ‘Fake news’ used for political gains in organized fashion, confirmation bias, echo chambers
  • No clear solutions for various actors to deal with ‘fake news’ (governments, private sector, etc.)

National Context (India)

  • Hindu Nationalist party in power for five years
  • Increased tensions between communities
  • Muslim communities especially vulnerable

Regional and International Dynamics

  • Historical tensions between Pakistan and India
  • Three nuclear powers in region cause constant geopolitical risks/fragility
  • Porous borders

Timeline

2019 - Alleged rape incident sparks riots

Alleged rape incident; riots erupt with attacks against refugees and and Muslim Indians; internally, government fails to respond to misinformation and resorts to internet shutdowns.

2020 - Refugee numbers at the India-Pakistan border reach 800,000

Large movements to the Pakistan border fuelled by rumours of open borders, while violence against Muslim minorities and refugees continues: the total number of IDPs, asylum-seekers and refugees in the India-Pakistan border region reaches 800,000. Meanwhile, ISIS make statements to encourage Jihadi violence in India. The information 'Great-Firewall' begins to take shape in India - censorship causes more rumors.

2021 - Militarization of the Indian/Pakistan border

Independent Committee set up to investigate.

2022 - Pakistan appeals to UN, India steps up censorship

The Pakistani government appeals to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 3rd Committee to bring up the humanitarian crisis involving the displacement of, by now, two million Muslims. However, the international community is hesitant to take sides because of the complex geopolitics and nuclear situation. Nevertheless, India – feeling uncomfortable with the growing international accusations – decides to impose internet restrictions and kick out foreign journalists. An independent committee/government report blames WhatsApp and Facebook for ethnic clashes, leading to foreign companies beginning to withdraw from India.

2022-2030 - Crisis simmers

The crisis simmers. The number of forced migrants keeps increasing at the border due to sporadic riots fueled by misinformation that has still not been curbed. There is an economic crisis and loss of jobs as a result of foreign investment pulling out. Other Indian Muslims who managed to get out of the country start moving to Europe through Central and Western Asia to claim asylum. Meanwhile anti-Muslim and anti-migrant sentiments deepen around the world, with riots happening in many countries. Regional and international responses continue to fail for lack of commitment.

2028 - Pakistani call for extraordinary UNSC session fails

Pakistan petitions for an extraordinary session at UNSC but fails to obtain support from other permanent members.

2029 - Western states call on the UNGA to reopen refugee definition

Instead of addressing the anti-migration and Islamophobia wave, some Western countries within the UNSC decide to request the UN General Assembly to reopen the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention.

2030 - Forced migrant numbers reach 10 million

Countries threaten to denounce the Refugee Convention all together - meanwhile the crisis remains unsolved, by now surpassing the 'Syrian crisis'. Number of forced migrants reaches 10 million.

History of the Future

It is 2030, and misinformation has often been deployed as a tool by various actors for personal and political gains and was further inadvertently spread by unknowing individuals. There was no clear and sustainable response to deal with the problem as it was unclear who was responsible or accountable. There was neither means nor, in some cases, incentives for governments or technology platforms to address the issue.

In India, as in other parts of the world, the problem of misinformation was also exacerbated by the environment on the ground. Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments were common. Concerns were twofold: firstly, fears that the 40,000 Muslim Rohingya refugees coming in from Myanmar would make parts of India unsafe and secondly, the suspicion that the numbers were much higher than reported.

This narrative was reinforced by local political functionaries who played a part in furthering communal chasms in society. Both social and traditional media were polarized, and did not serve as a reliable source of information but as an echo chamber, confirming existing biases and further embedding inflammatory sentiments. Misinformation further deepened the existing fault lines in the region: the historical relationship between India and Pakistan, the growing influence of China in the region, and the presence of three nuclear powers made this region particularly volatile.

In 2019, someone claimed to have witnessed a male forced migrant from a religious minority raping a woman. The 'witness' shared this information on social media with a blurry photo taken from afar. The information quickly grew into an accusation that a Rohingya refugee man raped a pregnant Hindu woman, and this news went viral within hours on WhatsApp, Facebook and other social media platforms. Local government received the news, but struggled to verify this information, failing to locate the so-called eyewitness. Some political factions within the government also stood to benefit from tensions between communities to justify implementation of draconian laws, since it was easy to polarize the debate and keep power. A government official mentioned this misinformation as fact on national television. Following this, riots broke out in the province in which the alleged attack happened. Initially targeting only the Rohingya minority group, rioters quickly began to target broader minority groups – Muslims – forcing large groups of people to be internally displaced within days. Because of the national news announcement, protests started in other states too, which quickly turned into angry riots targeting Muslim minority neighborhoods. To deal with growing violence against minorities, local governments shut down the internet for short periods in pockets of the country. Rather than quieting the riots, the information blackout led to more spread of misinformation. WhatsApp also introduced a new feature limiting the number of forwards that could be made, to little effect. Within Muslim communities, news of lynching and that villages were being burnt down began to spread, causing more panic and displacement. At around the same time, news also spread that Pakistan was criticizing India internationally and the former had opened its border to welcome persecuted Indian Muslims. Within months, and by 2020, hundreds and thousands flocked to the Pakistan-India border.


Wagah border checkpoint at the India-Pakistan border. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Between 2021 and 2022, Pakistan tried to condemn India internationally, finding allies in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries. It also announced that it would provide temporary asylum for those Indian Muslims with kin in Pakistan. However, within months, tens of thousands had set up camp at the India-Pakistan border, and Pakistan was unable to take them in. These people became internally displaced persons (IDPs), and since India is not a signatory to the UN Geneva Convention, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was not able to respond on the ground effectively. A humanitarian crisis built up and Pakistan and India began militarizing the border.

By 2022, global powers – such as Western European nations, the US, China, and Russia – began to comment on the situation, calling for the Indian government to halt the violence, but refrained from condemning India too harshly. They trod carefully, wary of the complex geopolitical situation in the region, and also partly out of concern with the growing anti-immigrant sentiments back in Europe. Both the US and China were ambivalent and only made weak statements of concern. China, an ally of Pakistan which had been criticized for its handling of Uighurs within its own border, was not vociferous in condemning India. The US, wary of the nuclear rivals India and Pakistan and because of Pakistan’s importance in the war in Afghanistan, was also cautious.

At the same time, Muslim extremist groups, such as the Taliban and ISIS, started to issue threats against Indian nationals around the world, declaring the situation another example of global Islamophobia and Muslims being mistreated in various contexts.

Between 2022 and 2028, the mass arrival of Muslims at the border provided continued fuel to the anti-Muslim discourse inside India, claiming “Indian Muslims were always Pakistani.” Riots continued. The Indian government, at local, state and national level, failed to find the right response. They set up a committee to investigate the reasons for the violence, and rather than getting to the bottom of the initial incident, blamed instant messenger platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook for spreading misinformation. The international social media platforms, having been made a scapegoat and faced with heavy censorship and internet blockades, and seeing how the riots continued with the government failing to respond, decided to withdraw their operations from the country. Seeing the continued worsening business environment and instability, other multinational companies also started pulling out. Struggling with continued criticisms internationally, the Indian Government increased censorship, and eventually decided to impose a Great Firewall, limiting the use of international social media and Google altogether. They also started kicking out foreign journalists and NGOs. The withdrawal of international investments along with political turbulence caused the economy to suffer, leading to job losses, and further unrest.

In 2025, Pakistan continued to petition the UN General Assembly for an international fact-finding mission to understand who the targets and perpetrators of the violence are, but was not successful in getting a consensus. It was now very hard to get accurate news from within India. Citizen journalists tried to do guerilla reporting, but many were warned against doing so and some were arrested. Internationally, a civil society consortium, working with Indian citizen journalists, tried to launch a fact-checking platform, but by this time it was hard to make sure that news reached either the Indian majority or the Muslim minority groups within India.

In late 2026, a regional conference was convened by UNHCR in which major Western European nations, China, Russia, the US, the ASEAN countries, and some civil society actors participated. Although the conference produced a call for the end of violence and a communiqué suggesting preventive actions, no effective policies or joint effort resulted.

Due to continued misinformation by smugglers (who claim that the Pakistani government is allowing all forced migrants entry into Pakistan), more forced migrants moved towards the Pakistani border. Meanwhile vulnerable migrants were exposed to the risk of smuggling and trafficking upon arrival in Pakistan.

By 2027, it was clear that the Pakistani government was struggling to deal with the humanitarian needs of the displaced population. At the same time, internally displaced Muslims within India who were denied access to Pakistan were stranded at the India-Pakistan border in precarious conditions. Due to lack of Indian humanitarian support their situation became even more dire. Meanwhile, UNHCR was unable to provide sufficient support to the displaced on either side of the border due to lack of funding as well as the lack of legal framework.

As the humanitarian situation in the border region worsened, Muslim forced migrants began to move outside the region and especially towards the Middle East and western nations in 2028. Rumors emerged that radicalization was taking place among the forced migrants. ISIS started claiming responsibility for sporadic terrorist attacks self-proclaimed to be in the name of displaced Indian Muslims.

Within the context of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia, stark and opposing views about forced migrants and forced migration intensified within Indian society and countries with sizeable Muslim communities. Both traditional and social media discourse across the globe conflated forced migrants with all Muslim communities – despite the fact that not all forced migrants are Muslims and not all Muslims are forced migrants. In solidarity with persecuted Indian Muslims, Muslim communities around the world mobilized to advocate for them (e.g., by holding protests). There was a global deepening of the pro-Muslim/anti-Muslim divide around the world, and sporadic clashes happened in different countries. There were continued attempts to verify information about events in India and Pakistan to clarify misinformation (e.g., by civil society actors), but they failed.

In solidarity with persecuted Indian Muslims, Muslim communities around the world mobilized to advocate for them (e.g., by holding protests). Source: Wikimedia Commons

By 2030, the total number of IDPs inside India, refugees in Pakistan, and asylum seekers reaching countries beyond the immediate neighboring region has reached 10 million.

Due to the continued targeting of Muslim groups within India and the humanitarian crisis, which had now lasted for several years, the government of Pakistan as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council recommended an extraordinary meeting on the situation on the Pakistan-India border. They considered the current situation a manifestation of Islamophobia and xenophobia. However, potential destination countries in the UNSC (such as the US, France, and the UK) voiced opposition to any initiatives to support the forced migrants, claiming either that they lack further capacity to provide asylum, or alleging that Muslim forced migrants were abusing the institution of asylum and that many among them were radicalized. In this context, these UNSC members have suggested that the Third Committee of General Assembly establish a working group to reconsider the definition of a 'refugee' within the Refugee Convention (to further limit access to asylum for Muslim populations). They have threatened that unless the definition is reconsidered and narrowed down, they will abandon the Refugee Convention altogether. With growing skepticism over the effectiveness of the current refugee governance regime (e.g., failed calls for those displaced by climate change to be recognized as refugees), the future of the current system, i.e., UNHCR and the Refugee Conventions, faces unprecedented threat.

Scenario 2: The Together Framework

A New Platform of Shared Responsibility for the Challenges of Forced Migration

According to the United Nations, today we are witnessing an unprecedented level of forced human mobility. Globally, approximately 68.5 million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes. This total number of forced migrants includes more than 25.4 million refugees, three million asylum seekers, 10 million stateless people, and over 40 million people who are estimated to be living in internal displacement. In fact, UNHCR concludes that about every two seconds a person is forcibly displaced.

To protect forced migrants and further strengthen global governance on forced migration, throughout the years, world leaders and global institutions have adopted multiple declarations, including:

  1. The 1951 Refugee Convention, which asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is considered a rule of customary international law.
  2. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, agreed in 2015, which recognizes the positive contribution made by migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development.
  3. The 2016 New York Declaration, which includes commitments both to address the issues we face now and to prepare the world for future challenges. The global declaration highlights the commitment to protecting the rights of women and girls and promoting their full, equal and meaningful participation in finding solutions. It also led to the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018 – which recognizes the need for a model of shared responsibility especially with regard to humanitarian and development actors working closely together – and several major hosting countries signing up to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

However, the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis has shown that neighboring and proximate countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, can not share the responsibility alone given the high costs on services, infrastructure and social cohesion. Rather, other member states and actors should share in the responsibility along with them. Therefore, Scenario 2 offers a distinct possible answer to the question of who will be leading and developing the model of shared responsibility in 2030 and how these new actors will play an essential role in re-imagining forced migration governance.

Specifically, Scenario 2 puts forward the following insights:

  • Forced migration will continue to spread globally over the next decade, gaining in traction and variety. Without involving other actors in developing a clear plan for shared responsibility, states’ commitments to protect the rights of forced migrants will continue to weaken.
  • A new international platform of shared responsibility for the forced migration challenge will be initiated by forced migrants themselves.
  • In 2030, cities, the private sector and social entrepreneurs will become the main partners in supporting a new platform of shared responsibility. This platform will clearly outline cities’ and the private sector’s commitments on addressing the forced migration challenge at the local level.
  • The effectiveness of this new platform of shared responsibility will be rooted in participating actors and practicality of the outlined commitments.

History of the Future

It is 2030, and with the global rise of populist governments and anti-immigrant movements, forced migrants are feeling ever more marginalized in their host communities. Given the availability of technology, particularly in Western European states, forced migrants are mobilizing to address injustices against them.

In late 2022, frustrated by the lack of a global response and bureaucracy to address the forced migration challenge, a global private company (such as Google) was approached by a group of forced migrants, championed by a delegation of Syrian refugees, to help make forced migrants’ voices heard. As a result, a cross-sectorial incubator of ideas or hackathon was organized by and for refugees and other forced migrants in a Western European city, to brainstorm refugee-led solutions to address ever growing migration challenges. A platform was created, titled the 'Together Framework,' also known simply as 'Together.' The platform brings together interested parties which are eager to explore innovative integration mechanisms and possibilities of fostering collaboration at the local level in order to ease rising tensions between host communities and forced migrants.

The platform was initiated in a Western European city with a large presence of forced migrants where citizens are relatively supportive of forced migrants’ integration. This city also has key supporters in the private sector, access to international organizations, and an overall innovative ecosystem.

The participants of the hackathon set up Together as cross-sectoral framework that outlines clear commitments for each participating party as well as their incentives to join.

Due to the positive impact of civil society campaigns geared towards raising awareness for the need to include forced migrant voices when developing solutions for their protection and integration, as well as early successes of the Together Framework, a growing number of political leaders took a strong public stance in support of this call. In addition, given the lack of coordination and coherence among the different actors working in forced migration governance, recognition of the need for a new framework/initiative led by forced migrants themselves grew. In light of these developments, forced migrants sought to increase their agency through the Together Framework to help them become advocates of their own stories. In 2020, the Together Framework sought to act as an umbrella platform to bring together and create synergies among relevant actors, and spread the use of the platform in other cities.

In 2020, Donald Trump was re-elected as US President. In February 2018, the Pentagon had requested $550 million for border security and 'train and equip activities' in Syria. The Turkish media mistakenly assumed that all of the funding was allocated to the Kurdish YPG militia in northern Syria. In 2020, after being re-elected and under pressure to fulfill election promises, President Trump pulled military funding from the Kurdish YPG militia. With the unexpected lack of funding, the militia was left vulnerable, leaving the Kurdish population unprotected.

In 2020, Donald Trump was re-elected as US president. Source: Wikimedia Commons

By 2021, as Together began to pilot its innovative cross-sector approach, participants demanded that governments provide a new legal framework allowing forced migrants to travel to participating cities and have the right to work there. City IDs began to function as a legal document to confer the right to work in 'Together Cities.' Additionally, Together involved tax incentives for companies in those cities to hire forced migrants.

Based on the pilot, participating actors created the 'Together Toolkit' for other cities to share skills, knowledge and how-tos on welcoming forced newcomers. The technology-based toolkit provides stakeholders with guidance on developing an implementation strategy to invite other cities/stakeholders to join the framework and to adopt and adapt it to their needs.

In 2022, during the pilot project, the UN unsuccessfully sought to address the root causes of failed integration approaches around the world. As a result, the US pulled its funding from UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the International Labour Organization (ILO). In light of the resulting global migration governance funding crisis, states started to consider unconventional approaches such as the Together Framework to bridge the protection gap.

The strength of the Together Framework is rooted in its replicability: it is a model that can be easily adopted in other cities. After seeing positive results from the first city to adopt the Together Framework, between 2022 and 2023, five more cities adopted it and used its how-tos to address diverse forced migration challenges at the local level. These cities included Kampala, São Paolo, New Delhi, Mexico City, and Strasbourg.

With growing environmental stressors, the Asia-Pacific region was in search of new actors to help govern the issue of environmental displacement. Indonesia, particularly hit by natural disasters and struggling as a transit country, requested help from its neighbors for durable solutions to protect Afghani, Somali, and Sudanese refugees post-natural disaster. In 2024, Sydney was the first city in the Asia-Pacific region to adopt and replicate the Together Framework to reduce the pressure on Indonesia. To honor bilateral agreements with Indonesia, the Australian government supported the transit of a small number of refugees to be resettled in Sydney. This proved the adaptability of the Together Framework to address diverse global migration challenges.

Although the platform started to spread, in 2025 populist leaders and parties in different countries criticized it as a globalist initiative that threatens state sovereignty. Nevertheless, cities continued to adopt the Together Framework, supported by progressive city government administrations.

Between 2025 and 2026, in light of diverse global migration challenges, the Together Framework offered a highly adaptable solution. As a result, by 2026, the Framework had been replicated in an additional 20 capitals in both the Global North and South, creating a powerful city network for forced migration governance.

In the years after the US pulled military funding to the Kurdish militia in Syria, there was a sharp rise in persecution against Kurds in neighboring Turkey. By 2026, this had reached an unprecedented level, causing tens of thousands of Kurds to flee towards Europe.

In addition to the preexisting border challenges, and the millions of forced migrants held in camps in Turkey, forced migration continued to increase worldwide. The incapacity of national governments to deal with these challenges became ever more evident. Turkey could no longer host another mass influx of forced migrants in addition to its millions of protracted refugees. In 2026, tens of thousands of Kurds fled Turkey for Europe. Turkey forwent its agreement with Germany and other EU member states to serve as a primary host country and opened its borders. Millions of forced migrants began to make their way to Europe. Most European states tried to block their entrance.

Millions of forced migrants began to make their way to Europe. Most European states tried to block their entrance. Source: Wikimedia Commons

In light of the Turkish refugee crisis, European states once again (as during the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis) were unable to find a common solution or agree on a mechanism to successfully share the burden and responsibilities of refugee protection. As a result, from 2026 to 2027, the humanitarian crisis at the border continued. The Together Framework started to mobilize actors to fill the vacuum, including translators, medical staff, lawyers, social workers, and shelter providers.

Fighting back against the rise of xenophobia, more cities turned to replicating the Together Framework to become part of the city network. The city network helped address problems of xenophobia and racism by disseminating information more efficiently to the host community to increase awareness and the sensitization of the host population towards the rights and needs of forced migrants. Problematically, with the growing prominence of the network of Together Cities, participating cities attracted more forced migrants than non-participating European cities. To counteract this new form of unequal burden-sharing, a City Capacity Index was created (see policy project 1) to map cities' ability to efficiently host people.

In 2027, to combat the escalating humanitarian crisis at the closed borders, several Together Cities held referendums on whether or not to welcome refugees. Despite overall anti-migrant tendencies in the countries as a whole, their cities overwhelmingly voted in favor of hosting refugees.

In order to avoid public uprisings, national governments issued a limited permit in the form of a City Pass that allows travel to and residence in the respective Together Cities that voted to welcome refugees.

Since this time, to enter a Together City, refugees have had to enter into an agreement with the welcoming city to deliver on the following commitments, within a reasonable time frame:

  1. Willingness to learn the language;
  2. Gender equality in public spaces and workplaces;
  3. Local involvement in civil society (e.g. volunteering work).

The measurable effectiveness of the Together Framework has been tested and proven by its rapid response to the Turkish-EU forced migration crisis. Throughout 2027 and 2028, The Framework successfully debunked predominant refugee myths and demonstrated particularly the economic benefits of hosting forced migrants at the local level.

In 2028, members of the Together Framework hosted the first World Forum of City Networks on Forced Migration, at which they started the process of lobbying states at the UN to consider the Together Framework as a viable solution to address significant gaps in global migration governance. This forum was held in partnership with the Council of Europe and the main regional institutions gathering the official stakeholders in Forced Migration Governance. In 2030, 200 cities around the world have adopted the Together Framework. Due to the success of the Together Framework and the strength of the 200 cities who have employed it, UN member states have moved to officially recognize the Framework as an effective new global public policy. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to develop a new global governance scheme of shared responsibility to manage the forced migrations challenge. This new scheme aims to overcome the constraints of state sovereignty, emphasizing the collective commitment to concede more authority to local actors, and to provide incentives for social entrepreneurs and the private sector to provide solutions.

From Scenarios to Policy Projects

Scenarios are used to make possible future developments imaginable and to define the plausible range of what could happen. Re-imagining forced migration governance for 2030 was not an end in itself. Our ultimate aim was to create concrete policy projects to prepare for the future by avoiding or mitigating future threats and working towards realizing opportunities that are not yet clearly visible. Our policy projects are ideas on how to make policy intervention happen by identifying, among other things, key sponsors, partners, resources, and creating the political mobilization to make change happen.

Policy Project 1: City Capacity Index

The City Capacity Index (CCI) is a key tool that aims to measure the capacities of urban centres to receive forced migrants in a materially and socially sustainable manner. It focuses on cities, with emphasis on developing countries/countries of the Global South that have already expressed the political will to host newcomers, in the context of the failure of nation-states to share the responsibility of newcomers.

Intervention

The intervention aims to ensure that cities that have already expressed the political will to host newcomers, like Kampala in Uganda, are well-prepared to sustainably host them for the long-term. A think-and-do tank made up of multi-disciplinary researchers and practitioners will develop a set of criteria that assesses the capacity of a city to host newcomers (e.g., its healthcare, education, and housing systems, social cohesion, and employment opportunities) – the outcome of which is the City Capacity Index (CCI). The CCI will reflect real-time core indicators (e.g. levels of clean water and sanitation provision) that have applicability across cities, but also includes a set of variable factors that reflect the specificity of each city (e.g., high levels of air pollution in New Delhi).

The index will also provide a narrative on the specific forced migration context of the cities (e.g., its history of receiving newcomers and the number of existing newcomers). The mapping of the local demands and the city’s capacities made possible by the CCI will allow the arrival of forced migrants to be treated also as a local development opportunity, instead of always as a 'burden'. This is the case because the CCI will be able to collect data and monitor the real impacts of the presence of forced migrants, unveiling through applied research the varying effects of receiving newcomers for the local economy and society. It will finally foster the territorial resilience of the cities, analyzed through the indications of weaknesses and strengths in cases of crisis the index gives.

The CCI is underpinned by the notion of ‘area-based’ interventions/investments (i.e., interventions that focus on the challenges in a locality and do not discriminate based on the population’s origin). This, in turn, builds the capacity of cities to provide services for both newcomers and locals and enhances social cohesion.

Cities will meet periodically to review and improve their score on the index. Cities facing similar challenges can exchange best practices, such as for public resources allocation, external funding opportunities, investment attraction, and international technical cooperation, either in the field of humanitarian aid or international development.

Outcome and Value Proposition

The CCI will empower cities to:

  • Comprehensively (i.e., across various sectors) determine their capacity to host newcomers in the short and long-term;
  • Effectively match newcomers to the needs of the city (e.g., newcomers meet the labor market needs of the city);
  • Identify their investment needs in terms of services, infrastructure, conflict resolution mechanisms, etc., that benefit both locals and newcomers.

Further, the CCI will create and institutionalize a network of researchers and practitioners focused on addressing the challenges and opportunities of hosting newcomers,with particular emphasis on how to ensure replication beyond the initial 10 pilot cities. Critically, the beneficiaries will not only be the cities, citizens and newcomers, but also the researchers and practitioners working across these cities. Researchers will have an opportunity to see their work developed into practical, implementable interventions, while practitioners will see their on-the-ground experience incorporated into interventions.

Sponsors and Partners

The CCI will be hosted within an independent, multidisciplinary think-and-do tank. Even though this working group owns the Index, various stakeholders will co-build/create and participate in the process of its development.

Some of the major key stakeholders will be international institutions such as IOM, UNHCR, the World Bank Group, the Council of Europe, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the European Union. Beyond financing, a board of partners will be created to strengthen and champion the initiative.

To build the CCI, the think-and-do tank will partner with several stakeholders to ensure that the index is usable, and adaptable. The main partners will be city authorities and governments, urban networks and associations, urban service providers, social entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, forced migrant associations, and citizens. These partners will work with the CCI team to provide data, assist in research, and influence the intellectual and ethical orientation of the CCI.

Resources

To embark upon this project, an initial funding of $1 million is required. This funding will be used over two years and will cover the pilot in 10 cities. To raise this initial grant, the think-and-do tank will approach governments for public subsidies and support at both federal and city level, private foundations interested in forced migrant issues, and other interest groups. Support will also be sought from multilateral organizations, if necessary.

Beyond funding, a multidisciplinary core team of five or six people will be required for two years to plan, research and develop the CCI for the pilot. The think-and-do tank will also provide an advisory board of experts to guide the core team. This board would include representatives of the city, academics, and forced migrant representatives, for instance. The core team will also rely on local universities for volunteers and strategic direction and guidance.

Mobilization

To attract a diverse set of partners and investors, the think-and-do tank will constitute a strong, skilled,committed, diverse team and will draw on existing networks across cities and multiple-stakeholders. A preliminary pitch will be developed to both coordinate working with the cities ahead of the pilot and once the pilot period is completed. The core team will develop a benchmark analysis in order to find the most relevant and interesting case studies (10 complex, varied, and politically willing cities around the world, with an emphasis on the Global South/developing countries). Building on the profile of the core team of the tank as well existing networks, the team will then design an attractive pitch that includes accurate and updated data and facts and initiate meetings with key stakeholders and partners with the aim of securing letters of support, endorsements and pledge funds.

After the team is composed and funds and support has been secured, the CCI core team will deploy sub-teams across the ten cities chosen for the pilot.

The team will work with cities, and will work horizontally to conduct solutions-oriented research, and ensure that the values of the open-source movement are reflected across aspects. Further, the ownership of the CCI will be within the think-and-do tank, but regular check-ins will be made with think-tanks across the world to solicit feedback and generate buy-in.

Activities

To develop the CCI, the core team will conduct on-the-ground research, including study visits to the 10 focus cities to understand the context of forced migration in each. The qualitative and quantitative research will focus on historical trajectories, responses, needs, legislative and social frameworks, and secondary data collection to develop the methodology to build the CCI. The methodology will be built on an open-source platform so that it can be a collaborative exercise between the core team and the key stakeholders. The index will be designed to be “live” and dynamic, and can be updated regularly by those involved in the process. This would make the index relevant and timely and will allow for it to be updated relatively cheaply. A draft of the Index will be presented at a conference involving the teams across 10 cities. This conference will not only help to chisel the index but also promote the concept, to bring in more cities into the fore.

Outputs

The output is a first of its kind, real-time Cities Capacity Index, comprising accurate criteria to analyze and replicate in various cultural contexts. The criteria will be updated regularly, to keep the ranking reflective of actual capacities. Also, in order to promote the results of our study visits and researches, audiovisual and redactional content such as podcasts, video documentaries and/or articles will be produced. An open-source platform to spread CCI’s news will enable greater visibility through the community of cities and more impact thanks to online collective intelligence. Finally, the methodological process to conduct this research will result in a report that will be useful for future researchers within our growing cross-sectoral network.

Policy Project 2: Media Literacy Initiative

This project aims to clarify misinformation around forced migration, with the ultimate outcome being better protection for forced migrants throughout the migration journey.It will provide an easier option for forced migrants and the public to fact-check suspicious information, accompanied by offline trainings, guidelines and toolkits.

This project is a multi-party collaboration to fight and prevent misinformation. It will have two key groups of outputs: (1) offline guidelines and trainings; and (2) a tech platform connected to social media that will offer a more convenient tool for fact-checking. This platform will carry out fact-checking through a combination of machine-learning and human network of on-the-ground journalists with sufficient expertise, NGOs, lawyers, and forced migration experts. The network will operate on the principle of transparency and every fact-checking organisation will have to be accredited and will be named on the network. We will include training for all fact-checkers on the ground to make sure they adhere to a protocol of fact-checking concerning forced migration. Since an understanding of the importance of language and local context is crucial, ideally each country will have its own network of fact-checkers covering all major local languages, contributing to a global network.

At the moment we are not aware of a good initiative or piece of technology to fight fake news. There are different fact-checking platforms but they are mostly limited to checking the words of politicians. There is no initiative dedicated to forced migration.

Theory of Change

Our theory of change is that with reduced misinformation about forced migration, and heightened awareness and more accurate stories of forced migration, there will be increased sensitivity towards ethnic diversity, reduced discrimination and bigotry, improved integration and human rights protection, and ultimately perhaps reduced forced migration in the first place. More 'genuine' potential asylum seekers receiving accurate information concerning asylum seeking procedures will increase the refugee recognition rate and recover public trust in the international refugee regime.

Sponsors and Partners

The project will be a civil society-tech platform partnership (involving UNHCR or IOM and private foundations like Google). It will have multiple sources of funding, such as: governments, private foundations like the Ford Foundation, Omidyar, other private sponsorship, and international governmental organizations.

In order to address misinformation, we will be collaborating with social media companies, social media marketing (SMM) companies, traditional media (e.g., local newspapers and radio stations), journalism colleges, professional groups (such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists), schools and universities, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local mass organizations, local public interest attorneys, relevant government agencies, and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).

Resources

A range of actors will contribute and collaborate in composing the data and information, they include (but not limited to) UNHCR, IOM, trustworthy fact-checking platforms, professional journalism organizations, human rights lawyers, academia, tech giants (e.g. Google), and think-and-do tanks.

Activities

The initiative will begin with the formation of NGO-led consortium, which is forced migrant-centric and multi-donor.

The intervention will be carried out through these activities:

  1. Through a 'compulsory' app in collaboration with popular social media platforms connected with a backend network of fact-checkers. When suspicious information appears on WhatsApp or Facebook, a user will either (i) receive a pop-up message “Pause – do you know if this information is real or fake?” and has the option of being connected to this fact-checking platform, or (ii) he/she can report this information to the platform.
  2. Depending on the nature of the information, either AI or human fact-checking or both may be engaged. The closest fact checker to the location of incidence will be deployed to investigate and share information on the platform. The platform will have a regularly updated list of the accuracy of viral information submitted by readers and users.
  3. There will be a specific section for asylum seekers with the most up to date information about the asylum-seeking process.

Offline, a series of toolkits, guidelines and trainings will be developed by a civil society-led consortium of partners. Offerings will include:

For forced migrants

Regularly updated tailor-made training and information campaigns for forced migrants. Specific sub-groups include: potential asylum seekers in the countries of origin and asylum seekers and refugees and other forced migrants in the countries of transit and destination.

For the public

Training sessions for schools and the public on how to be more critical about viral information they receive and spot red flags.

For social media platforms

Training sessions and guidelines on how to screen potential misinformation and remove it in a timely manner.

For journalists

Training sessions and guidelines for journalists on the importance of cautious verification when it comes to information about forced migrants, sensitivity to forced migration discourses and terminologies, and on how to report forced migration stories and make unheard voices heard.

For governments

Training sessions on how to screen misinformation and be accurate and transparent about information they release.

Mobilization

Phase 1: Seek pro bono support from a tech giant to develop app, form a consortium of potential fact-checking partnership organisations and media, and seek pledge of support from UNHCR, IOM and other potential donors

Phase 2: Secure seed funding, create pilot app, develop training materials, and then deliver at cities with key potential sponsors and partners to raise more funding for global roll-out.

Policy Project 3: TogetherCorps

According to UNHCR, the private sector plays an essential role in providing opportunities and services for refugees. Specifically, technology can democratize the quest for safety and the meeting of basic human needs. A cell phone is one of the few possessions refugees take with them when they flee their homes. And in many cases, having access to technology can mean the difference between life and death. Apps like WhatsApp and Facebook have given many refugees an opportunity to communicate with their families without the need for an overpriced mobile network. Apps like Google Translate allow simultaneous translation between refugees and humanitarian workers, providing opportunities for refugees to better integrate into their new communities. There are also digital programs that provide opportunities for refugees to earn their high school diplomas to be eligible to enter universities in their host countries.

But despite the overwhelming positive side of technology, there are some ways that technology can do harm. The risk of doing harm is especially high if technology is specifically designed for refugees but is created without their input. There are many examples of well-intentioned innovations that made refugees more vulnerable and unprotected. For example, some of the technology does not have the capacity to protect the identities of people who are looking for refuge. If this data lands in the wrong hands, it can lead to surveillance and further persecution of refugees. Another example is when a blockchain app is designed to help migrant workers make sure the contract they sign with a factory down a brand’s supply chain is legitimate (hence reducing risk of being trapped in modern slavery), but the ownership of this data rests with the brand rather than the worker.

TogetherCorps will help private companies to promote a forced migrant-centric approach toward (i) developing services and products for forced migrants and (ii) general policy toward engaging forced migrants e.g., employment practices and diversity policies. It will work as a certification system similar to B Corp - a combination of self and objective assessment - and there will be a general code of conduct developed with the industries, as well as specific codes of conduct when it comes to the different industries.

The work of TogetherCorps will be rooted in three key principles:

  • Do no harm: Engaging with private companies to jointly design a set of good practices on how to follow ethical and legal considerations when working with forced migrants.
  • Inclusive design process: Establishing trainings (with minimum attendance required for certification) for private companies that would like to develop services for forced migrants.
  • Active engagement of forced migrants: Engaging forced migrants through fair employment, Corportate Social Responsibility (CSR) or other ways of meaningful and sustainable support in relation to integration.

Key Components

  1. A certification system which recognizes companies that are setting good examples in providing services and products for forced migrants and employing them. This will include an online and offline training on the various aspects of how to involve forced migrants.
  2. A ranking/award system that would showcase the companies with best and innovative practices.
  3. Advocacy aimed at broader mindset shift to redefine corporate responsibility to include how companies work with forced migrants. This part can ride on existing movements of diversity, corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental social and governance (ESG) requirements, Creating Shared Value (CSV), and business and human rights, and would involve working with actors like CSR and ESG consultants, universities, governments, investors, banks, and finance regulators etc.

Sponsors and Partners

TogetherCorps will be a non-profit organization established in the United States, led by forced migrants, and in collaboration with NGOs and companies. It will over time grow into a network of branches across the world like B Corp (which has over 2500 certified B Corp in over 50 countries today) We will be working with partners to co-develop the training program.

Its initial funding will come mainly from philanthropic and corporate donors, and a pledge of support from UNHCR. Over time it will be able to generate some income from the certification process.

The following organizations will be targeted as potential donors or sponsors: Google, Facebook, UNHCR, Chobani, and Starbucks. Potential fund managers like BlackRock and ESG analysis providers like MSCI and Bloomberg will also be targeted.

TogetherCorps

The TogetherCorps in a nutshell.


Companies will want to be certified to show their commitment towards doing no harm to forced migrants; an inclusive process of involving them in designing products and services for forced migrant; and active engagement through employment or other meaningful and sustainable ways of support in relation to integration.

Lessons Learned: Group Dynamics

The group realized that it was important to share narratives to better learn from each person’s unique contribution and knowledge of the field. For instance, the group acknowledged the critical importance of Sayid’s presence, who has personal experience with being a ‘refugee’.

The group was also grateful for the rich cultural diversity in the room, and that for this reason all members of the groups should speak up and trust their contributions. It was important for the group to also recognize the need to create a culture of a 'safe space', where all members were free to articulate their perspectives without judgement. Further, because all members care deeply for the topic, impassioned debates were a manifestation of this, not necessarily personal conflicts between group members. While acknowledging that some members in the group come with ‘expert’ knowledge, it was agreed that an over reliance on this knowledge could prove counterproductive for a such an exercise that requires stretching one’s imagination beyond what they may see as important and relevant for the current time.

Most importantly, the group affirmed that it was important to enjoy the process and have fun!

About the Methodology

What are the most pressing global challenges in the coming decade that we need to think about today in order to avoid surprises, mitigate risks, and make use of opportunities? In search of the answers, GGF fellows collaborate in developing new and better ways to think about a future that they themselves will help to shape.

The GGF method supports the fellows in this ambitious task by providing an intellectually challenging framework that enables structured communication and rigorous thinking. The fellows use a variety of strategic foresight instruments, including scenario planning and risk assessment, to constantly create a better understanding of future challenges. GGF fellows combine their insights on possible future developments with their distinct normative convictions about the shape and role of global governance.

Learn More

About the Fellows

Sayid Abdullaev - United States, Associate Product Marketing Manager at Google

Sayid Abdullaev is an associate product marketing manager at Google, where he works on marketing and communication strategy for the Google Analytics products. Motivated by his personal experience as a refugee, Sayid is harnessing the power of technology and big data to develop a Digital Refugee Empowerment Center that will serve as a resource hub for programs and policy related to capacity building and advocacy for refugees. Previously, he worked as a consultant at the United Nations, focusing on the World Humanitarian Summit and youth activation programs. He has founded multiple initiatives under the umbrella of refugee empowerment, youth for peace, and LGBTQ, and helped raise over $10 million for a variety of causes. He has been recognized by multiple organizations and foundations, including former US presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, for excellence in global activism. Sayid is an alumnus of the Harvard Business School’s Venture Management Fellowship and a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in political science.

Thiago Assunção - Brazil, Assistant Professor of International Relations at University Center of Curitiba (Unicuritiba)

Thiago Assunção is assistant professor of international relations at University Center of Curitiba (Unicuritiba), Brazil, where he created a course on refugee law and designed a global governance study tour, taking a group of students to international organizations based in Switzerland, including the United Nations, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). He participates in initiatives on migrants and refugee integration in Brazil and has previously worked for the government of the State of Paraná on human rights policies. He has worked on human rights education for the Robert F. Kennedy Center in Italy, as well as on international cooperation at UNESCO in Paris. He was also a visiting researcher at the University of Geneva. Thiago holds a master’s degree in peace studies from the University of Rome, and will soon complete his PhD in international law at the University of São Paulo.

Cédric Bischetti - France, Director and Founder of Makers for Change

Cédric Bischetti is the director and founder of Makers for Change, an NGO based in Strasbourg, France. In his role, he coordinates, implements, and develops various projects in the field of newcomer inclusion and youth empowerment. He provides workshops, organizes events, and manages an intercultural team of more than 30 people. Until early 2015, he was a co-secretary of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, where his role comprised organizing and preparing the official monitoring visits to member states of the council such as Ukraine, Denmark and Azerbaijan, reporting directly to the secretary general of the local chamber. Cédric holds a bachelor’s degree in law and a master’s degree in political sciences and international relations from the University of Lyon III, France, where he focused on migration and crisis management. He is a fellow of the ChangemakersXChange and MitOst European programs.

Fransisca Christanti - Indonesia, Migrant Care Assistant at the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Fransisca Christanti is the migrant care assistant of the psychosocial division of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Indonesia, which aims to assist migrants in maintaining their mental health and well-being. She has also worked with Rohingya migrants in Langsa and Lhokseumawe, Indonesia, for UNESCO’s Andaman Sea Project. Previously, Francisca was a Pengajar Muda (Young Teacher) in the Gerakan Indonesia Mengajar (Indonesia Teaching Movement), where she was assigned to remote villages in the east of Sulawesi, Banggai, Sulawesi Tengah, and Indonesia. There, she focused on curricular and extracurricular activities as well as society development and educational network advocacy. She holds a bachelor’s degree from Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia, where she majored in psychology.

Naoko Hashimoto Japan, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Sussex (International Fellow of Nippon Foundation)

Naoko Hashimoto is a doctoral candidate at the University of Sussex (International Fellow of Nippon Foundation) and a research associate in the Refugee Law Initiative at University of London. Her doctoral thesis analyzes states’ practices of admitting refugees through resettlement. Prior to her doctoral studies, she gained 15 years of practical experience in refugee and forced migration issues, working for UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, and the Government of Japan in New York, Geneva, Sri Lanka, and Tokyo, among others. She has authored numerous publications on refugee and migration issues and has served as an independent advisor for many projects. She regularly appears on various media as an expert on refugees and migration. Naoko holds a master’s degree in refugee and forced migration studies from the University of Oxford (as a Sir John Swire scholar), and a master of laws’ degree in international human rights law from Queen Mary University of London and University College, London.

Astha Kapoor India, Independent Public Policy Consultant

Astha Kapoor is an independent public policy consultant, specializing in the delivery of government welfare services. Recently, Astha designed a $15 million grant strategy to improve Indian government services in light of increased use of technology for the Azim Premji Philanthropic Initiatives. Previously, Astha worked at MicroSave, where she advised Indian state as well as the Indian central governments on the design of programs with a focus on access to food. While at MicroSave, she designed and implemented India’s first pilot on using cash coupons for food in Karnataka. She has also worked with Dalberg Global Development Advisors, consulting clients such as Japan’s International Cooperation Agency and USAID. Astha has contributed to the Government of India’s 12th five-year Plan as part of the planning commission and has worked on India’s only universal basic income pilot with the Self Employed Women’s Association. Astha holds a master’s degree in social development from the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Netherlands.

Tze-wei Ng China, Part-time Lecturer and Consultant in Hong Kong

Tze-wei Ng is a part-time lecturer teaching media law as well as a project and legal consultant working with various social enterprises and a family businesses focused on sustainable finance in Hong Kong. Most recently, she worked for the international legal capacity building NGO PILnet: The Global Network for Public Interest Law, where she helped launch its Hong Kong office and programs in Asia. The organization connects pro-bono lawyers and law students with over 100 NGOs serving a range of poor and disadvantaged communities in the region. Prior to joining the nonprofit sector, she was a Beijing correspondent for South China Morning Post, covering international affairs, rule of law, and human rights. Tze-wei was recognized as an Emerging Leader on the Rule of Law and Policy in Asia by the Thailand Institute of Justice in 2017 and was a 2009 recipient of the Asia Journalism Fellowship. She holds a master of laws’ degree from Columbia Law School.

Helidah ‘Didi’ Ogude, South Africa, Social Development Specialist at World Bank in Washington, DC

Helidah ‘Didi’ Ogude is a social development specialist at World Bank in Washington, DC, and a doctoral candidate in public and urban policy at The New School, New York. At the World Bank, she works on complex political environments such as Central, East and Southern Africa, advising governments on policies and interventions geared towards protecting and enhancing refugee/IDP self-reliance and host community livelihoods. She has previously worked for the South African government in the Ministry for Economic Development as well as the Presidency, focusing on policies to address inequality. In her scholarly capacity, Helidah has conducted research in Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, including interviews with senior government officials, journalists, academics, organized civil society, and private-sector professionals. Her doctoral research explores how structures of power and discourse, neoliberal capitalism, and millennial consumerist culture relate to notions of identity, structural and spectacular violence, and migration. She holds a master’s degree in global affairs (post-conflict development) from New York University.

Angela Pilath - Germany, Doctoral Researcher at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford

Angela Pilath is a doctoral researcher at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on the politics of environmental displacement and theorizes the influence of experts on global policymaking relating to the protection of people displaced by natural disasters. In her work, Angela examines the intergovernmental negotiations of the Nansen Initiative and the UN climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Previously, she worked at the Paris Climate Conference as part of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) delegation, and was a visiting research fellow in the department for global governance at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB). Angela has lectured at the University of Oxford and the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands. She worked as research consultant for the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). She also was the academic editor for the Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration. Angela holds a master’s degree in refugee and forced migration studies from the University of Oxford, a minor in international relations from Sciences Po Aix-en-Provence, and a bachelor’s degree in European studies from Maastricht University.

Senior Fellow

Anne Hammerstad – International Relations Scholar

Dr Anne Hammerstad, an international relations scholar who specializes in the intersection of conflict and insecurity with humanitarian politics, refugee movements and migration. She is the author of the book The Rise and Decline of a Global Security Actor: UNHCR, Refugee Protection and Security (Oxford University Press, February 2014) and has written several articles in academic journals, as well as briefing notes, op-eds and book chapters on humanitarianism, refugees, migration, conflict and security, particularly in Southern Africa and South Asia. Her most recent work focuses on refugee and irregular migration movements to Europe and the impact of migration on the EU-Africa relationship. She has written on India as an ‘emerging’ humanitarian actor, South Africa’s response to Zimbabwean immigration, and transnational security challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. She is a contributor to the Oxford Handbook on Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Anne received her DPhil from the University of Oxford and a master’s degree from the London School of Economics and holds a bacherlor’s degree from the University of Oslo. She works on development assistance and humanitarian policy as a senior fellow with Agulhas Applied Knowledge and is an honorary senior research fellow at the University of Kent as well as a research associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs. She was formerly a global insecurities fellow at the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and has worked at the University of Kent; Royal Holloway, University of London; and the South African Institute of International Affairs, in Johannesburg.


Acknowledgments

GGF is made possible by a broad array of dedicated supporters. The program was initiated by GPPi, along with the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The program consortium is composed of academic institutions, foundations, and think tanks from across the nine participating countries. The core responsibility for the design and implementation of the program lies with the GGF program team at GPPi. In addition, GGF relies on the advice and guidance of the GGF steering committee, made up of senior policymakers and academics. The program is generously supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.